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FUNGIBILITY AND BANDWAGON EFFECTS OF CAPITAL TRANSFERS IN 




Collaboration between levels of government to achieve certain economic policy 
objectives, such as territorial development or rebalancing, is one of the essential 
arguments justifying the existence of intergovernmental transfers. However, it becomes 
more difficult to meet these objectives when part of the grants received, tied to certain 
specific uses, are used for other purposes by the recipient governments. There is 
empirical international evidence quantifying this fungibility of conditional capital 
transfers in very specific fields, such as education or child welfare. However, this 
literature focuses on spending, ignoring the other funding sources available to the 
recipient jurisdictions for these capital expenditures.  
To see whether donor governments have any reason to be worried about the final 
destinations of the grants they contribute, this work quantifies the diversion of resources 
by regions receiving conditional capital transfers. Our approach and methodology differ 
from the methods used to date in the available literature. Based on frontier investment 
estimations, we calculate the divergence between actual and potential investment, 
identifying this divergence as the fungibility effect. The capital expenditure of a region 
depends on its revenue available for that purpose, but not only on that, as different 
environmental factors also affect expenditure. For this reason, we think that frontier 
techniques are suitable for determining the investment potential of the region, as they 
are based on a comparative analysis of the best regional investment behaviour (rather 
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than the average behaviour considered in other methodologies), given similar financial 
resources. We also use the recently developed non-parametric partial frontier techniques 
to approach the possible existence of the opposite phenomenon: the bandwagon effect, 
dragging resources towards investment, which has received very little analysis in the 
literature. 
We do this for the 17 Spanish regions in the period 1991-2011, which includes 
economic booms and crises. This will let us analyse the regions’ investment response to 
the transfers they receive (fungibility/bandwagon effect) through the changes of the 
economic cycle. Also, the case of Spain is very interesting for these analyses because of 
the great efforts made by the European Union and the Spanish State to promote regional 
development, above all by means of large capital grants, especially to backward regions. 
The results obtained clearly show that Spanish regions divert hardly any resources from 
their intended investment purposes, with the most prosperous regions diverting the most 
from their potential investment or frontier. In poorer regions, we may even see the 
opposite effect of resources being dragged along by the conditional grants, given that 
some of them invest more in capital expenditure than the best-performing regions with 
similar financial resources. The explanatory factors we have found for this asymmetry 
in the investment behaviour of the regions include political aspects, poor management 
or planning associated with the accumulated debt, the political cost of tax collection, 
and other factors such as the level of economic development, population and population 
density, and the economic cycle. 
The work is structured as follows. The second section discusses the goals of the 
study from a theoretical point of view and reviews the available literature. The third 
section describes the non-parametric partial frontier methodology, the sample, the 
variables used in the estimations, and the results obtained. These non-parametric 
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techniques enable us to identify a significant asymmetry in the regions’ investment 
behaviour, which is ratified in the fourth section by the parametric Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis. As well checking the robustness of the previous results, the stochastic frontier 
approach lets us improve the explanation of the investment potential and identify the 
socioeconomic and political factors explaining the fungibility effect. We end the work 
with our conclusions. 
 
2. Problem statement and literature review 
The literature has shown that the effects of a transfer on expenditure depend on 
the amount of the transfer, and the spending habits and preferences of the receiving 
government (Rego, 2002). Fiscal federalism theory (Bradford and Oates, 1971) shows 
us that if the income elasticity of capital expenditure is greater than 1, when it receives 
the transfer the receiving government will take funds from current spending to allocate 
to investment. If the receiving governments are required to co-finance a percentage of 
the subsidised capital goods (compensatory transfers), the donor and receiving 
administrations will share the investment cost, reducing the price of capital expenditure 
for the receiver. In this case, the final result will also depend on the price elasticity of 
capital expenditure: if it is greater than 1, the receiving government will take funds from 
other uses and allocate them to capital goods, while if less than 1, part of the transfer 
will be allocated to current expenditure. Therefore, according to the conventional 
analysis, we can predict that compared to a compensatory conditional transfer, ceteris 
paribus there will be a lower investment level with an unconditional transfer of the 
same amount or a conditional block grant, as these stimulate spending through an 
income effect, while the conditional transfer adds a substitution effect which reinforces 
the expansion of capital expenditure.  
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Meanwhile, as long as a conditional grant stimulates investment beyond the 
preferences of the jurisdiction, there will be incentives for the jurisdiction to work 
towards its own preferences (Bradford and Oates, 1971, and Hines and Thaler, 1995) 
and divert resources to other purposes, such as reducing taxes, debt or the current 
deficit; increasing current spending; or even mismanagement of these resources
1
. 
 In this way, if there is a strong leakage effect, a conditional grant will 
essentially be equivalent to an unconditional grant, and will therefore have a very 
limited effect on investment. However, to prevent this reallocation of resources, 
measures can be implemented such as requiring an obligatory volume of investment, or 
that the receiving government contribute more of its own resources than the grant 
received, or maintains its tax effort (Zampelli, 1986). Alongside this, supervision and 
control systems are crucial, as is choosing the right design for scheduling transfers, 
which must be conditional and require co-financing. 
However, it may happen that the measures adopted to prevent the reallocation of 
resources are strong enough to cause the opposite phenomenon - in other words, the 
regions receiving the transfers have to complement them in order not to lose them, 
which can produce a bandwagon effect, dragging more resources towards investment 
than is economically sustainable, even against the wishes of the jurisdictions in the 
absence of grants
2
. The same will happen if the amount of the transfer received does not 
cover the desired investments of the receiving government, and it tries to supplement 
the transfer amount with its own resources, mainly when there is a significant lack of 
                                                 
1
 Receiving governments have various strategies for diverting resources (McGuire, 1979; Islam, 1998; 
Petchey and MacDonald, 2007; Leiderer, 2012): acquiring equipment which will be used in other 
services; redefining spending categories; financing fixed general expenditures of other non-subsidised 
programmes; selling the subsidised good in the market; or replacing their own resources, initially 
allocated to the subsidised function, with transferred funds and freeing up those resources for other 
purposes. 
2
 In this case, the sub-central government could be taking on future maintenance and current expenditure 
linked to this capital expenditure, which it cannot afford with its current available funding. 
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investment. To sum up, the transfers received can cause a bandwagon effect, leading the 
receiving government to make a greater investment effort than its available resources 
permit, taking funds from other expenditures which will be abandoned, or obtaining 
them from other sources, such as debt or taxes. Sagbas (2001) and Sagbas and Tolga 
(2008) analyse this bandwagon or stimulation effect for Turkey in the context of 
transfers and local spending, distinguishing it clearly from the flypaper effect, according 
to which local governments spend more if they receive an unconditional transfer from a 
higher level of government than if their own revenues increase. The flypaper effect has 
been widely studied in the applied literature (see the survey by Gamkhar and Shah, 
2007). 
A review of the extensive empirical literature on grants is outside the scope of 
this work, although we should highlight the influential contribution of McGuire (1975 
and 1978), which changed the methodology of the studies about the impact of 
conditional transfers (reviewed in Gramlich, 1977). Treating the price and income 
effects caused by these transfers as unknown parameters, McGuire quantified 
fungibility in the education sector at 70%. This work was followed by many more, some 
applied to other sectors
3
: for example, Zampelli (1986) placed the diversion of 
conditional transfers to local services at 40% to 70%; Meyers (1987) and Van de Walle 
and Mu (2007), who analysed the roads sector, found 63% to 85% leakage; Gold and 
Lowenstein (1996) and Gordon (2004) focused on education (10-80%); Islam (1998) on 
transport and healthcare (around 25%); and Ulbrich (2011) analysed the fungibility 
effect in child protection programmes, which has been very widely studied, with widely 
differing results (see the survey by Ribar and Wilhelm, 1999)
4
. In Spain hardly any 
                                                 
3
 However, not all studies find evidence of the diversion effect. For example, see Sha (1989).  
4
  Other complementary papers study international aid programmes (Leiderer, 2012 and Morrisey, 2015).  
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evidence has been found for the fungibility of capital transfers (Lago-Peñas, 2006 and 
Fernández et al., 2013).  
Analyses of the fungibility effect of capital transfers usually suffer from a series 
of limitations (Islam, 1998; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2013; Payne, 2009). On one 
hand, they are usually specified incorrectly, omitting important political, fiscal and 
institutional aspects. They usually use least square techniques which are not suitable for 
resolving econometric problems such as endogeneity and biases due to omitted 
variables. On the other hand, most of them merely quantify the fungibility or diversion 
effect, without explaining the reasons for the phenomenon or how it affects the response 
in terms of the subsidised expenditure. Also, in the few cases where they estimate the 
causes explaining divergences in the fungibility of conditional subsidies (Islam, 1998), 
they use a two-step procedure which can introduce biases in the estimations. Very few 
works consider the existence of the opposite phenomenon: resources dragged along 
towards investment. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, their analysis is usually 
partial, focusing on spending without simultaneously considering the other sources of 
funding of the recipient of the grant.  
There are works which analyse the partial response to transfers in terms of debt 
and/or tax effort (Morrissey, 2015; Delgado et al., 2015), but they do not include the 
changes which these transfers cause in the subsidised expenditure in question. This 
makes the work of Payne (2009) particularly interesting, as it indicates that a connection 
should be established between subsidised public expenditure and the other own or sub-
central sources of funding for such expenditure. In fact, given the budget restriction 
faced by any government, it can be inferred that capital expenditure is a function of 
income from capital transfers, current savings and net debt.  
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Alongside this, the shrinkage of funding sources due to the economic crisis and 
the subsequent budget tensions have demonstrated that sub-central governments can 
react not only by raising the public deficit, increasing tax pressure or reducing public 
investment and other expenditure; they may also focus on managing public spending 
more efficiently. The possible influence that the different environmental factors (such as 
the quality of management in different regions, the decisions each region makes 
regarding the illegal diversion of resources for purposes other than capital expenditure, 
etc.) may have on the investment behaviour of the regions means that determining the 
investment potential of a region not only depends on its funding sources, but also on 
causes which are difficult to capture in econometric models; hence, they must be 
included via a comparative analysis of the investment behaviour of the other regions. 
For this reason, our work connects the regions’ investment efforts to their funding 
sources, using frontier methodologies to analyse management efficiency. This approach 
lets us determine the maximum capital expenditure levels which can be reached for 
given resources, through the comparative analysis of the behaviour of different regions 
(capturing the environment factors), and quantify the fungibility effect, or alternatively, 





3. Non-parametric frontiers of investment and the effects of transfers 
In this first stage of our work, we intend to measure the divergence between the 
actual and potential investment of the regions, in order to see how far conditional capital 
                                                 
5
 Some of these frontier techniques have been widely used to analyse the efficiency of public spending, 
using public spending as input and an indicator of the goals of the spending programme as output (the 
survey in Afonso and Fernandes, 2008, may be of interest).  
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transfers, received by regional governments to reinforce their investment in specific 
ways, are used for other purposes. 
3.1 Methodology 
We think that frontier techniques, which are usual in the analysis of efficiency of 
companies’ production, should work well in the sphere of funding for capital 
expenditure, insofar as investment can be considered as the output of the donor 
government’s policy, which will be the function of a series of inputs - the financing 
sources available to the regions receiving the grants for making these investments. Also, 
both companies and governments are worried about the potential output (production or 
investment) which is unrealised. In the field of the production frontier this gap 
represents the level of inefficiency which a company cannot overcome, while in the 
field of public capital expenditure which concerns us here, it represents the unused 
investment potential or resource diversion effect, and could be caused by at least two 
groups of factors. On one hand, because the regional government wants to prioritise the 
provision of services to its citizens (current spending), the payment of financial costs, 
and/or a reduction in tax pressure or debt, whether for political reasons, the pressure of 
the crisis, or for having demanded a high level of tax effort from the citizens. And on 
the other, because there may have been poor practices in the planning and management 
of investment projects due to corruption, managerial incompetence by the governments, 
or a lack of suitable human resources, all of which could be considered an 
“unproductive” diversion of resources, or literal inefficiency. In all cases, the gap 
(fungibility/bandwagon effect) detected by any of the frontier techniques we are going 
to use must not be identified with the inefficiency in the provision of public capital 
expenditure which the literature has tried to explain (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008), 
10 
 
because this inefficiency could be precisely the cause of an excessive capital 
expenditure.  
In this work we use a non-convex version of Data Envelopment Analysis, the 
Free Disposal Hull (FDH) proposed by Deprins et al (1984). This is a non-parametric 
technique which facilitates the construction of a frontier, within which the regions with 
the maximum investment level given certain financial resources would be located, so 
that a region’s distance from the frontier would measure the fungibility effect. However, 
since this technique suffers from a series of problems (dimensionality problems, given 
its slow convergence rate; results are sensitive to outliers and measurement errors; and it 
does not let decision-making units be located beyond the frontier, so it cannot capture 
the possible bandwagon effect of transfers), we also use recently developed methods to 
evaluate efficiency for a partial frontier, which do not envelop all the data.  
Specifically, these are two robust approaches: Order-m (Cazals et al, 2002) and 
Order-α (Aragon et al, 2005), which Simar and Wilson (2013) develop in great detail. 
Both are generalisations of the FDH, so they are still non-parametric techniques, but 
permit super-efficient observations; in other words, located beyond the estimated 
frontier of possible investments, making the results much less sensitive to measurement 
errors and outliers, and eliminating the well-known “curse of dimensionality”. In this 
way, if there are no budget measurement errors, the super-efficiency these techniques 
can identify could correspond to a bandwagon effect on resources, in the sense that the 
jurisdictions located beyond the frontier will be outliers for the high volume of their 
investment effort, given the size of their financing sources and the behaviour of the 
other regions considered. 
When constructing the investment potential or frontier investment with all 
observations, the FDH will always offer results equal to 1 or less than 1; in other words, 
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results identifying either behaviour in accordance with funding capacity (when the 
result or investment effort is 1) or diversion of resources to other purposes, called 
fungibility effect (when the result is less than 1), but never bandwagon effects. However, 
as partial frontier techniques allow observations to be located beyond the frontier or 
maximum investment, they will identify the bandwagon phenomenon, dragging 
resources towards the subsidised capital expenditure. This bandwagon effect will be 
produced when the result is greater than 1, with a super-efficient region, in the sense 
that it invests more than the region with the best behaviour in the considered cohort of 
jurisdictions with similar financial resources. In contrast, a result less than 1 will 
indicate that a region is investing less than the region with the best investment 
behaviour in the sample - in other words, it is diverting resources to other purposes. 
3.2. Database and variables 
For these calculations we use panel data for the 17 Spanish regions over 21 years 
(1991-2011). This allows us to capture the possible variations in public activity with the 
economic cycle, and thus, the oscillations of the financial restrictions that regional 
governments have to handle.  
Our output is the region’s capital expenditure in terms of its income, KEGDP, 
including both direct investment and transfers, to avoid the risks arising from the 
possible  substitutability and interdependence of different types of investment. This 
form of measuring output comes from adopting the point of view of the donor 
government and its concern about unused potential capital expenditure. Table 1 shows 
the definition of each variable used, the source of the data, and the main descriptive 





Table 1: Definition of the variables used and their sources 






Capital expenditure (direct 
investment and transfers) of the 
region / Regional income 
General Secretariat of 
Regional and Local 
Coordination (SGCHL) 
and National Statistics 
Institute (INE) 
24.35 12.49 3.31 71.87 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF THE STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
Sources of financing              
IKTGDP 
Income from capital transfers / 
Regional income 
SGCHL (data on 
settlements) and INE  
8.63 6.84 1.00 E-11 42.82 
DEBTGDP Debt level / Regional income 8.75 8.91 1.00 E-11 63.13 
CSAVEGDP 
Current primary savings / 
Regional income 
16.85 12.41 1.00 E-10 108.46 
Institutional variables     
 
CAP 
=1 if the region has transferred the 
responsibility for education and 
healthcare 
= 0 otherwise 
By the authors 
0.71 0.45 0 1 
SPROV 
=1 if the region comprises a single 
province: Asturias, Cantabria, La 
Rioja, Madrid, Balearic Islands 
and Murcia. 
= 0 otherwise 
0.29 0.45 0 1 
SING 
= 0 for the Basque Country  
= 1 for Navarre  
= 2 otherwise 
1.82 0.51 0 2 
LIMIT 
= 1 in 2002-11 
= 0 otherwise 
 0.47 0.50 0 1 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF INEFFICIENCY 
Socioeconomic variables 
GDPpc Per capita income of the region 
INE 
13,348.08 7,435.37 0 
30,987
.01 
DENSITY Population / km2 142.91 153.78 17.60 808.38 
Budget variables 
TAXKE 
Tax revenue / Volume of capital 
expenditure General Secretariat of 
Regional and Local 
Coordination (SGCHL) 
2.23 2.64 0.05 25.68 
FINEXP 
(Interest + amortisation of the 
debt) / Current income 
0.06 0.06 0 0.611 
Political variables         
VOTES 
% of votes obtained in the last 
election by the party in 
government 
Ministry of the Interior 44.33 9.32 20.47 64.96 
POLCOLOUR 
= 1 if the party is left-wing 
= 0 otherwise 
Ministry of the Interior 
0.42 0.49 0 1 
ELEC 
=1 in an election year and the year 
before 
= 0 otherwise 
0.52 0.50 0 1 
Other hypotheses     
CRISIS 
= 1 in the periods 1993-95 and 
2008-11 
= 0 in other periods 
 0.33 0.47 0 1 
INSULA 
= 1 in the Balearic Islands and 
Canary Islands 
= 0 in other regions 
 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Source: By the authors. 
 
The inputs used correspond to the three strategies the regions use to fund their 
investments. First, income from capital transfers expressed in terms of regional income 
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(IKTGDP), as the government providing transferred capital funding can incentivise 
regional investment and generate a bandwagon effect on resources; although this can 
also produce the opposite effect, diverting funds towards current spending or lower 
taxes, or be lost along the way in unproductive practices, due to inefficiency. Second, 
the policies affecting current savings, as regions can practice austerity in their 
management of current spending freeing up funds for investment, and make a higher tax 
effort enabling them to finance more investments, or the complete opposite. Therefore, 
we have taken as input current savings in relation to regional income (CSAVEGDP). And 
finally, annual income from borrowing, also measured in terms of regional income 
(DEBTGDP). Here it should be borne in mind that Spain limited the use of borrowing to 
fund capital expenditure, stimulating capital expenditures over current expenditures, as 
well as consolidating intergenerational equity. But to strengthen financial solvency, in 
2002 regional net indebtedness was prohibited, indirectly discouraging investment, as 
well as reducing the political benefits associated with the use of borrowing.  
Table 2 shows that in Spain, the existing model for the distribution of the 
transfers tends to exclude, totally or partly, the territories with the highest levels of 
development, as it does not adequately consider the richest regions’ need to finance new 
investment projects, nor the cost of replacement and obsolescence of their capital stock
6
. 
This has led them either to use current savings more intensively (as has happened in 
Murcia or regions such as Navarre, the Basque Country, Cantabria and the Balearic 
Islands, where income is usually above 75% of the European average), or to borrow 
more than the average (as in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, with a notably low 
weight of current savings in the latter two regions). It also shows the increasing 
                                                 
6
 In Spain these transfers basically come from European structural funds (60%), the Inter-territorial 
Compensation Fund (25%), and agreements between administrations (15%). The first two of these are 
strongly oriented to redistribution. 
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importance of transfers (Bahl and Bird, 2013), given the limited tax capacity of sub-
central governments and the growing restrictions on regional borrowing. This is 
weakening the exercise of political and fiscal responsibility by receiving governments, 
which eventually respond to the incentives introduced in the design of the transfers. In 
the current context, when European grants are decreasing, a well-designed distribution 
of the transfers is even more necessary.  
 
Table 2: Relative weight of the financing sources of regional capital expenditure 




Sources of investment funding 
 Total 





Andalusia 2.65 3.52 1.35 1.59 0.58 
Aragon 1.95 2.32 0.59 1.15 0.58 
Asturias 3.12 3.41 1.27 1.70 0.45 
Balearic Islands 1.59 1.93 0.31 1.23 0.39 
Canary Islands 2.16 2.95 1.00 1.42 0.53 
Cantabria 2.45 3.23 0.73 2.03 0.47 
Castilla-La Mancha 3.53 3.70 1.37 1.76 0.57 
Castilla-León 2.71 2.59 1.20 0.79 0.60 
Catalonia 1.27 2.11 0.50 0.71 0.90 
Valencian C. 1.44 2.12 0.41 0.95 0.76 
Extremadura 4.22 4.84 2.36 1.90 0.58 
Galicia 3.49 4.29 1.55 2.05 0.69 
La Rioja 0.87 1.21 0.23 0.61 0.37 
Madrid 1.92 2.40 0.75 1.14 0.50 
Murcia 4.13 4.87 0.32 3.97 0.58 
Navarre 1.65 2.69 0.27 2.00 0.42 
Basque Country 2.16 2.74 0.48 1.74 0.53 
Total  2.43 3.00 0.86 1.57 0.56 






The first block of Table 3, “Non-parametric models”, shows the relative 
investment effort of the Spanish regions, calculated with Stata, for the total frontier 
(FDH) and for partial frontiers (Order-m and Order-). The average execution level of 
investment potential ranges from 86% to 98%, depending on the technique used, and is 
closest to 100% with Order-. This means that in general terms, the regional 
governments have few opportunities to increase their capital expenditure, given that 
they divert hardly any resources to other purposes. If we take into account that the 
regions must have some room to manoeuvre to finance current spending or maintenance 
associated with the subsidised investment projects, we could say that they are 
practically on the frontier. Such high levels of use of the possibilities offered by the 
sources funding their capital expenditure are in line with the results shown in the scanty 
literature on Spain. Using a conventional methodology (FGLS), Lago-Peña (2006) finds 
that in the period 1984-99, nearly 90% of capital transfers increase spending and the 
remaining 10% reduce the deficit (which would correspond to the fungibility effect). 
Fernández et al. (2013), using vector autoregressive models (VAR), also obtain similar 
results for transfers from the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund and the period 1990-
2010. 
Table 3 also shows that poor regions, such as Castilla-León, Castilla-La Mancha, 
Asturias, Galicia, and Extremadura, which receive large capital transfers (as seen in 
Table 3), divert hardly any resources from their intended investments. There are even 
indications that the opposite phenomenon could be occurring, with resources being 
dragged towards gross capital formation, given that the Order- technique counts them 
as super-efficient decision-making units. This bandwagon effect could be capturing a 
true stimulus effect, in the sense that these regions use resources for investment which 
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should really be used for other purposes. This may be happening, for example, in 
Castilla-León, where the volume of capital expenditure exceeds the resources available 
for investment, as shown in Table 3. But given the methodology used by these 
techniques to construct the frontiers, it may also be indicating that the fungibility effect 
is absent, or hardly present. In other words, the diversion of resources which has 
become habitual, and which the legal framework permits up to certain limits
7
, may not 
be happening, or at least not at the same scale, in the regions located beyond the 
frontier, as these resources are atypically allocated to financing capital expenditure. 
This tendency to invest may be the result of the greater concern and interest of 
these regions in encouraging this type of action and fostering economic development, 
given their relatively disadvantaged situation. It may also be due to the quantitative 
weight of the transfers, which may occasionally lead them to overestimate returns on 
investment or distort the real situation so as not to lose the grants (Petchey and 
MacDonald, 2007). Another reason might be monetary illusion phenomena caused by 
transfer pricing, which must be controlled with mechanisms such as co-financing. But 
we must take into account that it could also be due to cost overruns, corruption, and 
inefficiencies which cause capital expenditure to rise sharply.  
Madrid, the Balearic Islands and the Foral regions (the Basque Country and 
Navarre)
8
 behave in a similar way. All of these, as prosperous regions, have very high 
investment efforts, which may be due to the capital city effect, in the case of Madrid; 
the island effect, in the Balearic Islands; and the special financing system of the Foral 
regions.  
                                                 
7
  However, the literature is full of cases where these limits are breached. 
8
 Although for α = 0.95 only Navarre is super-efficient, and the other three regions (Basque Country, 
Madrid and Balearic Islands) are on the frontier, as α is reduced they acquire super-efficiency. Order- is 
shown to be more sensitive than Order-m to the parameter value (α or m) used in each case, although the 




Table 3: Situation of the regions in relation to their potential investment frontiers* 
 Non-parametric models Parametric model 
 FDH Order-α  Order-m SFA 
Andalucía (1) 0.78 0.93 0.74 0.93 
Aragón (2) 0.78 0.86 0.78 0.71 
Asturias (1) 0.93 1.07 0.92 0.92 
Baleares (2) 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.49 
Canarias (1) 0.79 0.92 0.76 0.67 
Cantabria (1) 0.80 0.89 0.82 0.81 
Castilla-León (1) 0.99 1.17 0.98 0.95 
Castilla-La Mancha (1) 0.89 1.02 0.92 0.92 
Catalonia (2) 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.79 
C. Valenciana (1) 0.82 0.86 0.80 0.87 
Extremadura (1) 0.96 1.25 0.94 0.95 
Galicia (1) 0.87 1.09 0.89 0.95 
Madrid (2) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 
Murcia (1) 0.74 0.81 0.72 0.91 
Navarra (3) 0.99 1.25 0.98 0.95 
Basque Country (3) 0.92 1.00 0.91 0.99 
La Rioja (2) 0.81 0.88 0.83 0.77 
AVERAGE 0.86 0.98 0.86 0.86 
Poor regions (1) 0.86 1.00 0.85 0.89 
Prosperous regions (2) 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.75 
Foral regions (3) 0.95 1.13 0.94 0.97 
(1), (2), and (3): classification of poor and prosperous regions (differentiating foral regions) based on European average income 
(Eurostat). 
* Calculations for α = 0.95 and m = 300, although the frontiers were calculated with different values for the parameters, in order 
to check the robustness of the results.  
Source: By the authors. 
 
The other regions are below the frontier, regardless of how it is constructed, 
revealing the presence of a clear fungibility effect for the resources obtained from 
conditional transfers, which is high in Murcia, Valencia, and Aragon, but above all in 
Catalonia, which given its available resources is the region showing the greatest 
improvement margin in its investment activity.  
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Thus, the results demonstrate a significant asymmetry in the behaviour of 
regional governments receiving conditional capital grants in terms of the investments 
made. This asymmetry is summarised in the last three rows of Table 3, which show how 
the investment ratios (actual/potential) are greater in poorer than in prosperous regions, 
regardless of the technique used, suggesting that the fungibility of resources is less 
present in poor regions. In some of them, the Order-m technique even suggests the 
opposite phenomenon, the bandwagon effect, as discussed above. This result contradicts 
Sagbas and Tolga (2008), who found a fungibility effect in poor Turkish provinces, and 
a bandwagon effect in rich ones. 
 
4. The fungibility effect and its explanatory factors  
4.1 Methodology and variables 
Our study is completed by implementing the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA), an alternative methodology based on the stochastic frontier production 
possibilities suggested by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). 
This parametric technique lets us check and adjust the results obtained with the previous 
approaches and determine the explanatory factors behind the different levels of use of 
the investment potential (an aspect which has not been analysed until now in the 
available literature), estimating them simultaneously with the frontier investment. This 
can also be done with procedures associated with non-parametric techniques (Daraio 
and Simar, 2007), but a parametric approach, such as SFA, will enrich our analysis of 
investment, while allowing us to leverage the advantages and minimise the limitations 
of each method (non-parametric and stochastic), and to check the robustness of our 
previously obtained results.  
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SFA is increasingly popular internationally in empirical studies of public 
economy, based on the idea that no economic agent can be located beyond the frontier, 
so that any deviation from it can be considered as unused regional investment capacity, 
or fungibility effect. Therefore, this technique does not let us identify the bandwagon 
effect. However, it does let us see whether the hypotheses on the relationship between 
input (financing sources of capital expenditure) and output (potential investment) are 
significant, something which is particularly interesting in a study like ours. It also lets 
us incorporate dummies which capture the unique features of the institutions of each 
region (observed heterogeneity), which can influence their investment potential, and 
which we cannot consider with non-parametric techniques. Also, with the SFA we can 
see the causes of the fungibility effect.  
The stochastic frontier technique is implemented statistically through the 
specification of a regression model with two error terms, which for investment is 
represented as:  
 ln KEGDPit = 0 + R R ln xRit + H H ln yHit + vit - uit   [1] 
where KEGDPit is investment in terms of the region’s income i in year t, with i = 
1, 2, …, 17 and t = 1991, ... , 2011; β0 is the common constant for all the regions in the 
year t; βR and H are parameter vectors to be estimated; xRit would be the three sources 
of funding for investment in the region i in the year t: IKTGDP, CSAVEGDP and 
DEBTGDP, which are measured as explained above; and finally, yHit should capture the 
unique features of the institutions of each region, which can cause heterogeneity in the 
sample on the frontier. These last would be, first, a dummy variable (CAP) to reflect the 
uneven level of responsibility of the regions, according to whether they are responsible 
for education and healthcare, as these involve a greater volume of capital expenditure. 
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Second, a dummy identifying the single-province regions (SPROV), as these absorbed 
their respective Provincial Governments, assuming their responsibilities, and therefore 
their obligations in terms of investment projects
9
. Third, a qualitative variable to capture 
the unique financing systems of the Basque Country and Navarre (SING), which give 
them greater autonomy in tax matters. And finally, a qualitative variable (LIMIT) for the 
budget balancing rule introduced in 2002, which reduced investment potential 
significantly by eliminating a source of self-financing: borrowing. 
The error term vit in equation [1] represents the usual statistical noise - in other 
words, everything outside regional control (such as stochastic disturbances and random 
shocks, measurement errors, etc.). The second error term, uit, represents the distance to 
the investment potential or fungibility effect, given certain inputs (financial resources 
and institutional variables), and would be the function of variables, zit, which may 
change over time.  
   uit =  zit + wit,       [2] 
 where  is a coefficient vector to be estimated and wit is the error term. 
The variables, zit, which we have considered may influence the fungibility of 
resources, u, are grouped in five blocks. First, socioeconomic variables such as per 
capita income (GDPpc) and the population density of the region (DENSITY), although 
to capture decreasing returns or congestion costs we have also included density squared 
(DENSITY
2
). Second, two budget variables. On one hand, the regional tax revenues in 
relation to the volume of capital expenditure (TAXKE), intended to capture the political 
costs of using tax as a source of funding, which could make the regional government 
want to meet its own spending targets, diverting resources to other purposes. And on the 
                                                 
9
  In contrast, the regions with more than one province maintained the Provincial Governments, which are 
configured as an intermediate level of government between the region and its municipalities. 
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other, the importance of financial expenditure in current income (FINEXP), insofar as it 
reflects the financial risk assigned by the credit market, being therefore an indicator of 
capacity to co-finance new capital expenditure (Herrero-Alcalde et al., 2011). Third, we 
have taken into account various political matters which could affect the degree of 
control exercised by the regional government: the political colour of the governing party 
(POLCOLOUR), the existing level of political competition (VOTES)
10
, and a variable 
identifying the election and pre-election year (ELEC) to test the electoral cycle thesis. 
Fourth, we incorporated a qualitative variable (CRISIS) identifying the periods of 
economic crisis (1993-95 and 2008-11), in order to see whether capital expenditure is 
significantly reduced in these years, given its non-mandatory nature. And finally, given 
the unique features of the two archipelagos, we have incorporated a qualitative variable 
(INSULA) to capture their potentially different behaviour. 
4.2 Results 
In light of the methodology and hypotheses discussed above, we have estimated 
with panel data (1991-2011), and in a single stage, equations [3] and [4] of the 
stochastic investment frontier model, with random effects, proposed by Greene (2005) 
and Belotti et al. (2012)
11
, shown below: 
           KEGDP = f (IKTGDP, DEBTGDP, CSAVEGDP, CAP, SPROV, SING, LIMIT) + v - u [3] 
           u = g (GDPpc, DENSITY, DENSITY
2
, TAXKE , FINEXP, VOTES, 
POLCOLOUR, ELEC, CRISIS, INSULA) 
[4] 
                                                 
10
  We constructed the variable as a percentage of votes obtained, expecting that the lower the competition 
and its control over the governing party, the greater the investment effort (the Leviathan hypothesis). 
11
  In the true random effects model (TRE), the regions share the constant term of the specification. 
Although Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2007) point out that TRE models yield the most plausible 
estimations of efficiency, we also tested the fixed effects approach of Greene (2005), in which the 
constant term is different for each region, with the model giving similar results. 
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This estimation considers that inefficiency may vary over time, and the term 
inefficient excludes unobserved heterogeneity which does not change over time. The 
results, shown in Table 4, indicate the suitability of the SFA as a method for estimating 
the fungibility effect. Specifically, as the estimator  is significant in the model, the null 
hypothesis that  equals 0 is rejected, which confirms the suitability of the SFA as 
method of study in this case, i.e. the need to include the fungibility effect, u, in the 
investment capacity function, which should not be approximated using an estimated 
average behaviour function (OLS). Additionally, the significant value of  suggests that 
unobserved heterogeneity of the regions must be separated from the inefficiency effects, 
which validates the Greene (2005) approaches we use
12
. Meanwhile, the significance of 
the variables explaining the degree to which the investment potential is not used or 
fungibility effect, validates the suggested equation.  
The estimation indicates that the explanation of the investment potential of 
regional governments rests on a combination of the theses discussed above. 
Specifically, the model suggests that income from capital transfers (IKTGDP) is the 
financing source which makes most regional investment possible, with borrowing 
(DEBTGDP) and current savings (CSAVEGDP) being less important
13
. We also observe that 
when a regional government resorts to citizens’ income through borrowing or current 
savings, it presents a very low marginal propensity to invest (around 7%), compared to 
the result of financing with subsidies (25%), which may indicate the presence of a fiscal 
illusion problem connected to the flypaper effect. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 See Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2006). 
13
 Similar results are found by Fernández et al. (2013). 
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Table 4: Results of the stochastic frontier analysis of investment 
Variable Coefficient z-statistics 
Frontier model 
LIKTGDP 0.25661** 13.18 
LDEBTGDP 0.07476** 5.71 
LCSAVEGDP 0.06911** 4.01 
SING 0.41162** 7.49 
CAP 0.12736** 4.83 
SPROV 0.11549** 2.57 
LIMIT -0.01684** -5.16 
CONS 1.590829** 15.25 
Inefficiency 
GDPpc 0.001048* 2.00 
DENSITY -0.0041849** -4.27 
DENSITY
2
 1.3e-06 1.10 
TAXKE 0.1307379** 11.18 
FINEXP 2.076081** 6.56 
POLCOLOUR -0.922829* -2.25 
VOTES -0.0105506** -3.93 
ELEC -0.218227* -2.15 
CRISIS -0.736958* -2.35 
INSULA 0.9672978** 7.82 
CONS 0.424772* 2.19 
 (Ho:  =0) 0.638746** 19.57 
u
2
 0.0888998** 3.48 
v
2





 0.6387468** 19.57 
 0.5411886** 14.09 
 (**) Significance at 1% and (*) at 5%. 
Source: By the authors. 
 
The institutional variables are also key to explaining the investment potential, and 
as we expected, both the level of responsibility (CAP) and being a single-province region 
(SPROV) have a close and direct relationship with potential capital expenditure. Also, 
regions with a common financing regime may invest more than foral regions (SING), 
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which probably responds to the design of the transfer system (based on the criteria of 
equity) and the quantitative importance of European structural funds, which exclude the 
foral territories due to their high per capita income. Alongside this, the incorporation of 
the budget balancing law from 2002 (LIMIT) had the effect of reducing investment 
potential, as expected. 
  All the factors considered in the estimation of the unused investment potential or 
fungibility effect are also significant and have the expected sign. On one hand, the results 
indicate that the diversion of resources is directly associated with the region’s income 
level (GDPpc), as indicated by the non-parametric techniques in the previous section. 
The reader will recall that these showed that the richer regions divert more resources 
than the poorer regions. This may mean that regional development policies are effective 
and facilitate investment in the least favoured regions, while the wealthiest regions opt to 
prioritise current spending in response to a growing demand for public services from 
their higher-income citizens. This result would also confirm the hypothesis that 
opportunity costs for citizens in the most prosperous regions involve less control over 
government spending. On the other hand, density (DENSITY), which is an indicator of 
relative need for investment and differential costs (scale economies), shows that the most 
dynamic regions, where the population tends to concentrate, divert fewer resources, 
without any sign of decreasing returns in the management of capital public services or 
congestion costs (DENSITY
2
). This aspect is considered in the design of Spanish regional 
development policy, as an element determining the distribution of the transfers by the 
central government.  
  The two budget variables we have used also stimulate the fungibility effect. The 
significance of the tax variable (TAXKE) suggests that the political cost of tax collection 
makes governments prefer to meet their own spending targets, diverting resources to 
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other purposes (according to theoretical hypotheses, this result suggests a price elasticity 
of capital expenditure less than 1). And greater financial expenditure (FINEXP), making 
it difficult to obtain financing due to higher credit risk, means less capacity to co-finance 
investment projects, some of which may remain unrealised, with the resources being 
diverted to other purposes (financial or current spending). 
  The model also reveals that political factors explain the fungibility effect. 
Specifically, it shows that majority governments (VOTES) divert few resources from 
their intended investments, as the absence of political competition hinders the approval 
of unwanted capital projects; and that in election and pre-election years (ELEC) there is 
less diversion of resources, as the government seeks the political benefits of the 
investments (Bahl and Bird, 2013). We have also found different investment behaviour 
according to the ideology of the governing party, with left-wing governments diverting 
the fewest resources (POLCOLOUR).  
The significance of the CRISIS variable reveals the cyclical behaviour of the 
fungibility effect. Despite the role of investment as an adjustment variable in times of 
austerity (Allain-Dupré, 2011), given that capital projects are a type of spending that is 
not committed to ahead of time (compared to current and financial expenditure), the 
model shows that during the periods of economic crisis or budget stress, the gap 
between potential and actual investment is smaller. This is probably due to the 
stabilising role of investments attributed to income transferred from the central 
government, but also to the shrinkage of potential investment in times of crisis, due to 
greater budget restrictions.  
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Finally, despite the special treatment of the archipelagos in development policy, 
the model shows that the geographical and economic disadvantages of being an island 
favour the fungibility effect
14
.  
Knowing the hypotheses determining the investment potential of a region and 
the factors influencing the diversion of resources to purposes other than capital 
expenditure, we have calculated the degree to which each region really uses its potential 
investment capacity. The margin between each one and the frontier will therefore be the 
fungibility effect we want to measure. The results obtained with the stochastic frontier 
method, displayed in the right-hand column of Table 3, show a high degree of use of the 
investment potential of the regions, at an average of 86%. Thus, the Spanish regions 
divert an average of 14% of the resources they obtain for investment purposes, with the 
poorest regions diverting the fewest resources. This asymmetry in the allocation of the 
transfers is in line with the non-parametric methods, contributing to the robustness of 
the results. One might think that an asymmetrical behaviour of this type, continuing 
over time, would contribute to reducing the existing gap between both types of regions, 
bringing their respective stocks of capital closer together.  
The evolution over time of the executed/potential investment ratio, displayed in 
Figure 1, also shows a very similar pattern, regardless of the estimation technique used. 
The high point of this evolution was the heavy investment effort made in the early 
1990s, at the time of the Seville Expo and the Barcelona Olympics, at a level which has 
not been repeated. In fact, the fungibility effect was especially intense in the following 
“hangover” years, although it must also be remembered that this was a period of 
                                                 
14
  We have also tested other variables. We tested different definitions of the SING variable, which we 
include to explain the investment potential of the region. To explain the fungibility effect, we also tested 
the weight of the agricultural sector in national income, and population, as alternative socioeconomic 
variables, as well as a variable identifying the regions governed by nationalist/separatist parties, and 
another which captures whether the party in the regional government is the same as the national 
governing party. However, they all produced less satisfactory results.  
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intensive adjustment prior to Spain’s entry into the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. Another notable year is 2005, for the shock of the sudden drop in EU funds due 
to the Union’s expansion to 25 member states, which led to a drastic reduction in the 
execution of capital expenditure in many Spanish regions, with a much higher diversion 
of resources to other purposes
15
. Finally, it will be observed that the current crisis, the 
full scope and effective impact of which is still unknown, has obliged the Spanish 
regions to change their investment effort, increase their tax pressure or reduce the 
resources assigned to other budget items, but it is also true that it has probably 
incentivised improved management and a more efficient allocation of resources.  Indeed, 
it has very possibly caused a combination of all these strategies. 
Figure 1: Changes in regional investment over time  
  
 
                                                 
15
 There are several explanations to be found for this cyclical behaviour. On one hand, a smaller volume 
of transfers reduces the financial illusion, and therefore the costs of certain investment projects are not 
undervalued, so that a conservative outlook would lead to a rejection of investments of marginal 
importance in order to adapt to the new framework. On the other, a reduction in transfers reduces the 
crowding in effect or the attraction of private investment, which is co-financer along with public grants, 
so this was another way in which the least profitable investment projects were abandoned. It must also be 
taken into account that although the financing system of the regions offers them the possibility of 
obtaining more resources through their regulatory powers over certain taxes, the unpopularity of these 
measures usually leads them to use this legal capacity to reduce taxes, so that hardly any income is 











Donor governments providing conditional grants reveal their concern that the 
regions receiving the grants may divert these resources to purposes other than 
investment (fungibility effect): reducing tax collection, debt or the current deficit; 
increasing current spending; and even losing them along the way due to poor 
management. For this reason, donor governments are designing their programmes of 
conditional capital subsidies to stimulate investment in the region receiving the grants, 
while incentivising the incorporation of additional resources to capital formation by the 
receiving government. For this reason, this work tries to quantify the fungibility or 
bandwagon effect caused by conditional capital transfers in the behaviour of the 
Spanish regions, using various frontier techniques.  
Both the non-parametric techniques and the stochastic frontier analysis show a 
fungibility effect, which is present especially in the most prosperous regions. However, 
only non-parametric partial frontier techniques, which let regions be located beyond the 
frontier, can technically identify a bandwagon effect which drags resources towards 
investment, which is localised in some poorer regions. This asymmetry in investment 
behaviour may reflect the pattern of redistribution incorporated in the design of capital 
transfers, and the interest or preference of poor regions for this type of activity as a 
factor of development and economic growth. The average fungibility effect in Spanish 
regions can be established at 2% - 14%, although many regions clearly have a greater 
margin for manoeuvre to increase investment effort.  
The results of our analysis also show that the fungibility effect depends directly 
on regional income, the budget variables, and insularity; and it relates inversely to 
population density, the number of votes, being involved in an election campaign, or a 
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left-wing party being in power. In temporal terms, the model shows that for the Spanish 
regions, periods of economic crisis notably reduce the fungibility effect.  
To conclude, it should be noted that there are at least two worrying situations or 
challenges to be faced. On one hand, the gradual reduction in European funds and the 
reaction of the regions which depend on them most heavily (such as Extremadura, 
Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla and León, and Valencia), together with much tougher 
restrictions on borrowing. On the other, the situation in regions with congested capital 
goods or specific deficits hampering their long-term prospects for economic growth 
(such as the Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Madrid, and Aragon). Therefore, to ensure the 
continuity of the process of growth and internal convergence, it would be 
recommendable to consider a reform of the funding system which would guarantee a 
greater level of financial autonomy, enabling regions to obtain sufficient additional 
resources to co-finance the subsidised projects, and complementing the centralised 
development policy, adapting it to the different preferences of the territories (Petchey 
and MacDonald, 2007), without having to take resources from other purposes 
(bandwagon effect) nor divert them from their intended uses (fungibility effect). This 
would make it possible to attend to the needs both of lower-income regions, and of 
wealthier regions whose growth is limited by congestion or a scarcity of strategic capital 
goods, such as infrastructure, other public equipment, or spending on R&D. 
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Table 1.A: Correlation matrix of variables 
  KEGDP IKTGDP DEBTGDP CSAVEGDP CAP SPROV SING LIMIT GDPpc DENSITY TAXKE FINEXP POLCOLOUR VOTES CRISIS ELEC INSULA 
KEGDP 1.00 
                
IKTGDP 0.74 1.00 
               
DEBTGDP 0.12 0.08 1.00 
              
CSAVEGDP 0.45 0.25 -0.28 1.00 
             
CAP -0.04 -0.12 0.18 0.11 1.00 
            
SPROV -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.05 -0.15 1.00 
           
SING -0.03 0.34 -0.13 -0.20 -0.18 0.16 1.00 
          
LIMIT -0.21 -0.29 0.21 -0.10 0.24 -0.02 -0.21 1.00 
         
GDPpc -0.54 -0.67 -0.17 -0.02 0.40 0.17 -0.16 0.26 1.00 
        
DENSITY -0.64 -0.61 -0.08 -0.28 0.06 0.32 -0.15 0.15 0.42 1.00 
       
TAXKE -0.61 -0.50 0.01 -0.20 0.38 0.14 0.09 0.47 0.54 0.44 1.00 
      
FINEXP -0.19 -0.03 0.14 -0.22 -0.50 0.15 0.08 -0.16 -0.24 0.08 -0.21 1.00 
     
POLCOLOUR 0.18 0.30 0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.17 0.15 -0.05 -0.28 -0.23 -0.12 0.02 1.00 
    
VOTES 0.07 0.18 -0.11 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 0.33 0.05 -0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.07 1.00 
   
CRISIS -0.17 -0.28 0.27 -0.15 0.14 -0.04 -0.25 0.92 0.19 0.09 0.37 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 
  
ELEC -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 1.00 
 
INSULA -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 0.00 0.03 -0.22 0.10 -0.10 0.18 0.13 0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.25 -0.06 -0.01 1.00 
Source: By the authors. 
